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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 
vs. ] 
JOHN R. TERRY ; 
Defendant-Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 950656 
> Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JOHN R TERRY 
In addition to the facts and arguments contained in the Appellant's Opening Brief (Terry's 
Br.), Terry submits the following points in reply to the statements and arguments contained in the 
State's Responsive Brief (State Br.). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT FAILED 
TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH RULE 11 IN TAKING TERRY'S GUILTY 
PLEA, WHICH RENDERS TERRY'S PLEA INVALID 
Reply to State's Argument that the Trial Court Lacked Jurisdiction to 
Entertain Defendant's Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea 
The State correctly argues that in general Utah law precludes a person from withdrawing a 
guilty plea after thirty days from the day the guilty plea was entered. However, this general principle 
of law is not applicable in Terry's case because he did not intelligently and knowingly plead guilty. 
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution is violated when a guilty plea is not 
entered intelligently and knowingly. In McCarthy v. United States. 394 U.S. 459,466 (1969) the 
United States Supreme Court said 
A defendant who enters such a [guilty] plea simultaneously waives several 
constitutional rights...For this waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it 
must be an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. 
Consequently, if a defendant's guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has 
been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void. Moreover, because 
a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot 
truly be voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in 
relation to the facts. 
In Terry's case, there was quite a bit of discrepancy whether or not he understood the law in relation 
to the facts of his case. Terry was not aware that he was pleading guilty to "knowingly and 
intentionally possessing or using cocaine". During the plea colloquy the court said, "Are you entering 
a plea of guilty because you are in fact guilty?" Terry said, "Of possessing some residue, yes." (R. 
115) It is apparent that Terry thought that possessing residue and possessing cocaine were two 
totally diflferent concepts. It appears that Terry thought by saying he was guilty of having some 
residue that he wasn't guilty of possessing cocaine (the crime that was actually charged). 
At several times during the plea colloquy, there was confusion on the part of Terry as to what 
he was pleading guilty to (See Appellant's first brief pages 12-15 for a detailed description of the 
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troubling parts of the plea colloquy). A trial judge bears the burden of showing that a guilty plea was 
intelligent and voluntary. In Boykin v. Alabama. 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) the court said, "It was 
error, plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without an 
affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary." The trial judge should have explicitly 
clarified the elements of the crime to Terry and made that affirmative showing on the record that 
Terry's guilty plea was intelligent and voluntary. 
Terry did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his plea, because there was too much confusion 
as to what he was pleading guilty to (R. 114-115). In State v. Stilling the court said 
The plea-taking proceedings are intended to insure that a defendant who pleads guilty 
knowingly and voluntarily waives the protections the constitution guarantees him or 
her prior to a trial verdict. This requirement protects a defendant's rights to due 
process The proceedings must demonstrate that the defendant understands the 
nature of each element of the offense charged and the burden on the state to prove 
each element beyond a reasonable doubt. 
856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added). It is quite obvious that Terry did not understand 
the nature of each element of the offense charged, and therefore did not knowingly and voluntarily 
enter his guilty plea. 
The right to Due Process that Terry was denied is a federal constitutional right. "The question 
of an effective waiver of a federal constitutional right in a proceeding is of course governed by federal 
standards." Douglas v. Alabama. 380 U.S. 415, 422 (1965). 
In line with the United States Supreme Court, Utah case law requires that a court must allow 
someone to withdraw a guilty plea that was not properly obtained. "However, if the trial court failed 
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to strictly comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in taking the defendant's 
guilty plea, and subsequently denies the withdrawal of the plea, the trial court has exceeded its 
permitted range of discretion as a matter of law." State v. Gibbons. 740 P. 2d 1309, 1312-14 (Utah 
1987). 
Furthermore, Utah courts have established that ,f[i]t is critical...that strict Rule 11 compliance 
be demonstrated on the record at the time the guilty.. plea is entered." State v. Smith. 812 P.2d 470, 
477 (Utah App. 1991) (emphasis added). Appellant's first brief thoroughly discusses the fact that Rule 
11 was not strictly complied with, and points out where the record doesn't demonstrate strict Rule 
11 compliance. 
Because Rule 11 was not strictly complied with when Terry's guilty plea was entered, the 
court never should have accepted the plea in the first place. Rule 11 (e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, Utah Code Ann. (1953) says 
The court...may not accept the plea until the court has found: ... (2) the plea is 
voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against 
compulsory self-incrimination...and by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is 
entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements... 
Because the court did not ensure that Terry's guilty plea was voluntarily made, and Terry was not 
informed of some of the rights he waived, and Terry did not understand the nature and elements of 
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the offense to which his plea was entered, the trial court abused its discretion by accepting the plea 
in the first place, and then again abused its discretion by refusing to withdraw the plea. State v. 
Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309,1312-14 (Utah 1987) (Recognizing that it is an abuse of discretion to refuse 
to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea which was not made in strict compliance with Rule 
11). 
Reply to State's Assertion That it was not an Abuse of Discretion for 
the Trial CQUit tQ Deny Defendant's Motion to Withdraw His Quilty 
Plea 
The State is wrong in asserting that the trial court's denial of Terry's motion to withdraw his 
plea was not an abuse of discretion. In the first place, Terry's plea was invalid because of the 
constitutional infirmities that existed when the plea was taken (see above arguments). Because the 
plea was invalid, the court never should have accepted the plea. Furthermore, because the plea was 
invalid, the court's acceptance of the plea is also invalid. The thirty day time limit of §77-13-6(b) 
assumes a plea that was valid (i.e. a plea that was taken when there was strict compliance with Rule 
11 (e), and was thus voluntary and knowing). Because Terry's plea was invalid, the thirty day time 
limit does not apply. "Once a defendant has pled guilty, the only non-jurisdictional avenue for 
challenging his conviction is to claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary." Romero v. 
Tansy. 46 F.3d 1024,1033 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 115 S.Ct. 2591 (1995). Because the plea was 
not knowing and voluntary, the jurisdictional 30 day time limit does not apply to Terry's guilty plea. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons asserted in the Appellant's opening brief and advanced in this reply brief, the 
decision of the trial court denying Terry's motion to withdraw his guilty plea should be reversed. 
Furthermore, Terry's sentence should be stricken as invalid because his guilty plea was invalid. 
Accordingly, this Court should remand this matter to the trial court with directions to allow Terry 
to enter a new plea and proceed to trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of October, 1996. 
Ronald L. Elton 
Attorney for Appellant 
John R. Terry 
85 North Main Street, Suite 200 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
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I herewith certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant John 
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Barnard N. Madsen 
Assistant Attorney General 
Jan Graham 
Attorney General 
160 E. 300 S, 6th Floor 
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